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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOANN TSAKOLAS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
OGDEN CITY,.a body politic, 
COWLES MALLORY, Ogden City 
Manager; JOHN SAMPSON,.STEPHEN 
DENKERS, and LYNN COTTRALL,. 
Ogden City Civil Service 
Commissioners; 
Defendant and Respondents 
and 
OGDEN CITY,.a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH,. 
Third-Party Defendant 
Case No. 19656 
BRIEF Or RESPONDENTS JOHN SAMPSON,.STEPHEN DENKERS,.AND 
LYNN COTTRELL, OGDEN CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS 
AND THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of Judge Omer J. 
Call allowing the Judges of the Third Circuit Court to direct 
that an employee not be allowed to return to the Court Clerk's 
Office to perform work there. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court ruled that the ex parte order of the Judges 
of the Third Circuit Court directing Appellant to the personnel 
office and not allowing her to continue in her position where 
she had access to court records was proper and that the order 
of Cowles Mallory, the City Managerf as modified by the Ogden 
City Civil Service Commission, was proper. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents,.Ogden City Civil Service Commissionersf 
and the State of Utah seek this court to sustain the decision 
of the lower court as well as ruling that Appellant did not 
become an employee of the State of Utah on July lf 1983. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to March 21, 1983f the Appellantf JoAnn 
Tsakolas, served as lead clerk in the Third Circuit Court 
Clerk's Office in Ogden City (T. 19). The Appellant was a 
Range 15, Step 5 civil service employee (T. 148). 
On Feoiuary 28, 1983, the Appellant attended a 
meeting in the office of the Trial Court Executive, Margaret 
Satterthwaite (T. 22). While there, the Appellant received a 
letter containing several allegations of missing court records, 
which was signed by both Mrs. Satterthwaite and Mr. K. D. 
Miller, Director of Community Services (T. 22). 
When questioned aoout the allegations, the Appellant 
stated that she was aware that "points" or tickets were 
withheld from the Driver's License Division (T. 23t 63). 
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Thereafterf however, the Appellant refused to cooperate any 
further either by telling what she knewf or by giving the names 
of others involved (T. 23^ 24). This was the situation 
irrespective or the fact that the Appellant held a supervisory 
position (T. 20, Exhibit 3-P). 
On March 4V 1983f the Acting City Manager, Jack 
Ricnaras, suspended the Appellant pending an investigation and 
hearing before the City Manager (T. 25f Exhibit 2-P). The 
Appellant was again made aware of the allegations against herf 
including the fact that in Utah, destroying public records is a 
third degree felony (T. 39, Exhibit 2-P). A hearing was held 
before the Ogden City Manager, Cowles Mallory, on March 18f 
1983i(T. 26). Evidence brought to light at the hearing was 
made known in Mr. Mallory's decision letter of March 21, 1983 
(T. 27, Exhibit 3-P). 
Included were the following: 
1. A traffic citation received by Appellant in the 
fall of 1980 and indexed by the Court noted "bail forfeited", 
however, the Driver's License Division showed no report of 
conviction and the case is now missing from the court files. 
2. In 1979, Appellant's sister received a traffic 
citation. The case was not reported to the Drivers License 
Division and is now missing from court files. 
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3. In 1980, Appellant's sister again received a 
traffic citation and bail was posted. Howeverf the Driver's 
License Division has no record of conviction. 
4. In 1981, Appellant's brother received a citation 
which was indexed and filed by the court. Now both the case 
and index card are missing from court files, and the Driver's 
License Division shows no record of conviction. 
5. The appellant had received a citation and had 
asked the Disposition Clerk in the Circuit Court not to send 
the citation to the Statef thereby keeping the citation off 
Appellant's record. The disposition Clerk did send in the 
citation, and the Appellant admits to having reprimanded the 
clerk for sending the ticket in. (Exhibit 3-P). 
The City Manager determined that the Appellant had 
"been involved in failing to notify the Driver's License 
Division or traffic otfenses thereby keeping "points" from 
being assessed against the violators as required by law." 
(Exhibit 3-P). These findings resulted in the Appellant 
receiving a fifteen day suspension without pay and a demotion 
which would be etfective upon her return to work (Exhibit 3-P). 
Upon receiving a copy of Mr. Mallory's decision, the 
Board or Judges of the Tnird Circuit met and reviewed the 
findings and its concerns relative to Appellant's returning to 
the Clerks orfice (T. 140rl43). Thereafter, the Judges 
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unanimously issued an Ex Parte Order "In the Interest of: 
SECURITY OF COURT RECORDS" (T. 142v Exhibit 4-P). 
The order was based on the Judges1 belief that the 
"integrity of the (court) records had been . . • compromised", 
because ot the Appellant's actions (T. 142^ Exhibit 4-P). 
The Judges based their authority for such an action 
on the statutory and implied powers of the court (T. 129) to 
oversee court personnel and records (T. 130). The Judges'-
actions were not intended to terminate the Appellant's 
employment (T. 131); they were meant only to safeguard court 
records. 
The Order stated: " . . . upon her return to city 
employment . . . report to the personnel department of the 
City. Under no circumstances is she to be allowed to perform 
any function in the Circuit Clerk's Office." (Exhibit 4-P). 
Mr. Mallory issued an amended order on April 7> 1983, 
reaffirming his decision of demotion and suspension but telling 
Appellant that she could not return to the Clerk's Office. Mr. 
Mallory, not the Judges, placed Appellant on unpaid,.inactive 
status stating that she would remain in that status until she 
obtained other city employment, the Judges lifted their order 
or July 1, 1983 arrived (T. 42^ Exhibit 5-P). 
On April 7v 1983, the Appellant received a letter 
from the City Manager which effectuated the Judges' ex parte 
order. The letter stated that following the expiration of her 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sick leave, compensatory and vacation timef the Appellant would 
be placed on unpaid inactive status; and such status would 
remain until other city employment was secured, or the Judges 
order was lifted (T. 42, Exhibit 5-P). 
The Appellant appealed to the Ogden City Civil 
Service Commission. In an order dated May 25f 1983, the Ogden 
Civil Service Commission, sustain two separate actions: (1) 
The Judges Order which directed that Appellant could not 
return to work in the Clerk's Office, and (2) the decision of 
the city manager except that part of the decision which 
appeared to transfer Appellant to the State of Utah come July 
1, 1983, which was overturned with Appellant retaining City 
employee status (T-45, Exhibit 6-P). 
Appellant appealed to the Second District Court for 
the State of Utah, and after trial, the Court ruled against 
Appellant's position. 
ARGPWEMI 
POINT ONE 
THE ACTION. OF THE JUDGES OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
WAS APPROPRIATE IN LAW AND WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF 
APPELLANT'S CURRENT CONDITION 
Appellant desires this Court to believe that somehow 
the action of the Tnird Circuit Judges caused the current 
condition of her with Ogden City. In fact, Appellant admits 
that the relationship is at most tenuous and attempts in a 
feeble way to put the blame on the Judges. In her Brief on 
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page nine, she states: "Despite several attempts by Appellant 
for other city employment,.she had been effectively fired." 
(Emphasis aaded). 
There is no question that the action taken by the 
Judges set in motion a series of events that places Appellant 
where she is now, but the record is devoid of any evidence that 
the Judges either intended, attempted or succeeded in 
terminating her from city employment. 
On the contrary, the record speaks clearly to the 
fact that no attempt was made to do what Appellant claims was a 
result or the Judges' Order. Judge Stanton M. Taylor, in 
testimony, acknowledged that the Judges had no such authority. 
He said: 
JoAnn was a City employee and we are 
not saying, hey, you have got to fire her. 
That's obviously not within our perogative. 
What we were saying is we don't want her back 
in our Clerk's Office. 
The Ex Parte Order (Exhibit 4-P) also sets forth 
clearly that the Judges were directing the City to place her 
in a position outside ot the clerk's office. The Order reads: 
YOU ARE HEREBY SPECIFICALLY ORDERED AND 
DIRECTED by the Court to inform Ms. JoAnn 
Tsakolas, upon her return to city employment 
as she was instructed to do by the city 
manager in his missive dated March 21, 1983, 
to report to the personnel department of the 
City. (Emphasis added) 
The order points out a couple of major items: First, 
the Judges acknowledged that she was returning to "city 
-7^ 
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employment"; secondf the personnel department was to work out 
the details ot placing her in a different position from the 
clerks orfice; thirdf she should in essence be assigned away 
from the clerks orfice. 
In viewing each of these areas, it is clear that the 
Judges were acting appropriately under authority given to them 
by both statutory and inherent power. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-/-5 describes the powers of 
every court established in the State of Utah. This statute 
empowers the courts to control the conduct of their ministerial 
officers and all persons connected with any judicial 
proceeding. In part,.it reads: 
Every court has power . . . (5) to control in 
furtherance of justice the conduct of its 
ministerial otficers,.and of all other 
persons in any manner connected with a 
judicial proceeding before it in every matter 
pertaining thereto. UCA § 78-7^5. 
As an employee in the Third Circuit Court Clerk's 
Otfice, the Appellant qualified under this statute as a person 
in any matter connected with a judicial proceeding. Hence, 
this statute applied directly to the ability of the Judiciary 
to control the presence or involvement of plaintiff in matters 
pertaining to any judicial proceeding. 
Appellant's access to Court records which directly 
led to the circumstances here presented is clearly under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
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Additionallyf Utah Code Annotated § 78-7-6.allows 
"[elvery court of record may make rulesf not inconsistent with 
law, for its own government and the government of its officers 
. • . ." Respondent Commissioners and the State of Utah would 
respectfully submit that the protection of court records by the 
court itself is or sucn fundamental importance that to not take 
action as done in this case would be violative of the most 
basic trust and ethics of the Judiciary. 
The Order as referred to previously is not a 
termination orderf but an order "In the Interest of: SECURITY 
OF COURT RECORDS." The protection of records was paramount, 
fundamental and the sole basis of the Order (T-131). The 
court may issue orders encompassing who, when,.and where, etc., 
records may be accessed. To not have such authority would 
play havoc with the ability of the courts to control and 
protect records and judicially sensitive areas. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is 
"fundmental that the court may;supervise its officers." 
Callister v. Callister, 393 P.2d 477 (Utah 1964). In this 
case, the Supreme Court determined that a probate judge must be 
allowed the discretion of supervising his officers in order 
that the court be aole to enjoy the public confidence. The 
court further determined that the executrix of an estate is an 
officer of the court. 
-9-
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This case illustrates two important points. First, 
where the public confidence in a court is threatened by the 
actions of any officer of the court,.the court can and must 
supervise the conduct of that officer. Second, if the 
executrix ot an estate is considered an officer of the courtf. 
then surely someone employed in the Court Clerk's Office is 
considered an officer of the court. 
Under this Utah Supreme Court standard,.then, Judge 
Taylor was acting within his authority in prohibiting the 
plaintiff's working in the Clerk's Office because of the 
greater interest of preserving the public confidence in the 
court. 
The City Manager's initial decision maintained intact 
"city employment11. The Judges' Order recognized that position 
and acknowledged "city employment", just not to be in the 
Clerk's Office. As Judge Taylor testified: 
Q. [Mr. Schwendiman] Were you attempting to 
terminate her from employment? 
A. No. I don't think we had the power to 
terminate her from her employment. I think 
the only thing we had power to say wasf you 
can't come into our office" (T-131). 
That was totally appropriate as the Judges acted in 
issuing their order from the Findings of Cowles Mallory. How 
the Judges desired their decision to affect the court records 
was discretionary with the Judges, not Mr. Mallory. 
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The Indiana Supreme Court also held in Knox County 
Council v. State ex. rel McCormick. 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 
405 (1940) that: 
The Constitution of this state vests the 
judicial power in the courts. The judicial 
is an independent and equal coordinate branch 
of the government. Courts were established 
for the purpose of administering justice 
judiciallyf and it has been said that their 
powers are coequal with their duties. In 
other words,<they have inherent power to do 
everything that jt? peqgggayy to carry put the 
purpose of their creation. . . . A court of 
general jurisdiction,.whether named in the 
Constitution or established in pursuance of 
the provisions of the Constitution, cannot be 
directed, controlled, or impeded in its 
functions by any of the other departments of 
the government. (Emphasis added) 
£ge 3lgo pyew V» County Attorney, Tulga CQVinty, 
394 P.2d 246, (Okla. 1964) (quoting Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97s. 
Okla. Cir. 294, 262 P.2d 725 (1953)). 
The existence of a City Civil Service System 
"cannot interfere with the ultimate power of the judiciary to 
administer its own affairs." Zylstra v. Pia, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 
539 P.2d 823^ 827 (1975). 
The appellant had duties which were an integral part 
of the judicial\function. A clerk's duties involve the 
performance or a "public trust" which in the present case the 
Appellant has violated. The court, therefore, cannot 
"relinquish either its power or its obligation to keep its own 
house in order." Id., at 826. 
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The court in In re Opinion of the Jugtiges, 14 N.E. 
2d 465 (Mass. 1938), discussed the nature of the relationship 
between the court and the clerk. 
This power of removal is judicial in the 
sense that it is incidental to the perform-
ance or the judicial functions of the court 
. . . . As to these officers, [court clerks] 
removal may be made as an administrative act 
without judicial process or without explicit 
requirement for hearing. The validity of 
such removal rests upon the intimate 
relationship between the duties of these 
officers and the performance of service 
essential to the courts . . . . Officers who 
perform work in connection with the courts 
may be removed as an incident of the judicial 
function. 
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court held the same way 
in a fact setting somewhat similar to the case at bar. In 
City o$ North Lag Vegas yy pajneSr 550 P.2d 399, a municipal 
court relieved the plaintiff of her duties as municipal court 
administrator. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the 
municipal judge acted within his inherent authority in 
relieving the municipal court administrator of her duties in 
the absence or evidence establishing an arbitrary or capricious 
exercise of that power. Id., at 401. The rationale of the 
court was that "the judiciary, as a co-equal branch of 
government,.has the inherent power to protect itself and to 
administer its affairs." Id.. at 400. 
Though several ot the above cited cases involve 
individuals without any "civil service" protections, it should 
be pointed out that in the present situation, the judges only 
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restricted appellants access to one segment of city employment. 
The Court's Order did not in any way terminate Appellant's 
employment rights with the city - only that she was not to go 
back to the clerks otfice. This decision was based on findings 
already entered by the City Manager. The court had authority 
both statutorily and inherently to act as it did. 
If Appellant has any claim in this matter at all, it 
is in relation to the decision of Mr. Cowles Mallory in placing 
her on inactive status instead of placing her in another 
position. Appellant has not appealed the decision of Mr. 
Mallory whicn is what placed her in her present condition. 
Mr. Mallory himself admits that he had authority to 
place her in another area of city government and comply both 
with the intent of the original order of retaining her city 
employment and the Judges order saying she should not work in 
the clerk's otfice. On cross examination by Mr. Schwendimanf. 
the following dialogue took place: 
Q. Weilf I mean prior to placing her on this 
Civil Service list. As a City employee who 
you put on inactive status, did you make any 
attempt to say, all right, here is an opening 
in this area. You are being placed in this 
position? 
A. Well, I don't run the City 
administration that way in placing employees 
(T. 96). 
* * * 
Q, (By Mr. Schwendiman) I believe the 
last question was you did not make an attempt 
to transter her after you learned that the 
-13-
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Judges weren't going to issue some kind of 
mass order; is that correct? 
A. Yesf sir. 
Q. You did not remove her from inactive 
status and place her in another position on 
active; is that correct? 
A. That's correct, but I just simply don't 
run the Personnel system of the City to the 
point where we place employees without the 
consent of the department (T-97). 
Mr. Mallory's admission confirms that it is not 
against the Civil Service System to place her, he just chose 
not to do so. That is not the fault of the Judges or the order 
issued by them. This was purely a decision made by him without 
the knowledge ot the Judges. Judge Taylor testified that the 
Judges were not involved in any of Mr. Mallory's decisions and 
only after the fact did they receive a copy of a letter placing 
her on inactive status (T-134). 
The above certainly vindicates the Judges of any 
improper action. Mr. Mallory chose not to place her somewhere 
else. This decision is the sole basis of any claim to city 
employment she might have. This decision of Mr. Mallory has 
not been appealed, and is not before the court. However, 
Appellant confused the actual bifurcation of the process and 
cannot hold the Judges responsible for her present condition. 
POINT TWO 
THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT JUDGES 
DID NOT DENY DUE PROCESS TO APPELLANT AND DID 
NOT VIOLATE HER CIVIL SERVICE RIGHTS 
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Without undue repetition Mr. Mallory's action and 
not the action of the Judges is the catalyst to the problems 
presently before this Court.. The express intent of the Judges' 
Order as verified by the evidence presented at trial was to 
have Ms. Tsakalos transferred to a different Department of City 
Government and diu not constitute termination. Mr. Mallory's 
own decision and not that of the Judges placed Appellant on 
inactive status. 
The District Court for the District of Columbia was 
involved in an actual termination case wherein some of the 
current issues were discussed. In Hadigen v. Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System, 463 F.Supp. 437-, (D.C. 
1978), the Court said: 
There is no requirement that an agency provide
 f 
an employee with the procedural rights triggered 
by an adverse action merely because it changes 
his work assignment or restricts his use of 
equipment. Such a change or restriction is not 
a removal . . . .w (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant argues that the Judges' Order was a 
removal. Not so. It was a directive for reassignment to a 
different area of city government. This is not a denial of due 
process, for if an employee is transferred or changed between 
joos at the same salary and benefits,.etc., that is totally 
allowed by civil service rules as well as the right of 
management. Appellant has presented no evidence that such a 
transfer is unconstitutional or that due process is denied 
through transfer. This is likewise sustained in Hadigen. 
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The failure of Cowles Mallory to effectuate a 
transfer as he admitted he did not attempt to do (T. 95-6) is 
the only issue that can possibly be challenged and that issue 
has not been appealed. 
The demotion and suspension of the Appellant is a 
separate issue, separate and apart from the present claims. 
This also was not appealed. Any claim for a denial of due 
process has been directed to the wrong party. 
The record is replete with substantiation that 
Appellant received due process in her hearing before the Ogden 
City Manager. Appellant was notified of the charges,.was 
granted a hearing where evidence was taken and where she was 
represented by counsel, a decision rendered which listed 
findings or fact and conclusions. She appealed both to the 
City Civil Service Commission and ultimately the District Court 
all of whicn sustained the findings. 
The Judges issued their order based on the findings 
and conclusions of Mr. Mallory. In fact, Appellant admitted to 
many of the serious allegations, all of which happened when she 
was a supervisor. Her major contention before the Commission 
and the District Court was not that she was innocent of serious 
charges (for she freely admitted involvement) but was the 
perceived disparity in treatment between herself and other 
employees. 
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Because of the unique nature of the court's authority 
to protect its records as was discussed in Point If above, the 
Court had every right to issue the order to protect its records 
based on its interpretation of findings of Mr. Mallory. The 
Court was adding no further punishment and was not disciplining 
Appellant. It was solely ordering that the city transfer her 
away from the Clerk's Office for the protection of the Court's 
records. 
Appellant has not established that the court could 
not do what it did. In factf that portion of the Civil Service 
Rules and Regulations cited by Appellant help establish that 
there was nothing out of the ordinary as to this directive by 
the court except that Mr. Mallory chose not to transfer her. 
The rule cited by Appellant does not prohibit 
transfer or reassignment to other equivalent classes or levels. 
There has been no showing or evidence presented either by the 
Appellant or the city that this was an impossibility. In fact, 
Appellant testified that she had been interviewed several times 
for openings (T. 44). Her not being placed in one of those 
openings is a matter of contention between her and the city and 
has no bearing on the order issued by the Judges. 
The only authority Appellant cites this Court in 
support ot its broad assertions is Gabe v. County of Clark. 
701 F.2d 102 (9th Cir., 1983). Gabe is not applicable in 
this situation because it stands for that which has already 
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been complied with — at least as it relates to the Order of 
the Judges. Gabe stands for the proposition that the status 
ot an employee's position cannot be changed without giving the 
employee adequate notice of the change. 
In the present case, the plaintiff received the 
required noticef as well asr a hearing before the City Manager. 
The Appellant was not denied due process to which she was 
entitled. See, e.g. Webb v. Dillon. 593 F.2d 656 (5th 
Cir. 1979). Tne Appellant, however, received more than minimum 
protection. 
The Order of the Judges did not change "status." The 
demotion and suspension already were based on the due process 
she had received. That was the "status11 change. The order 
only mandated that reassignment consistent with the decision of 
Mr. Mallory be effectuated. Transferf as already discussed in 
relation to Hadigen, supra. was totally appropriate. 
In Gabe the plaintiff was an employee in the Clark 
County Clerk's Otfice from June 1971 to September 1976. In 
September ot 1976 Ms. Gaue was transferred to the Eighth 
Judicial District as a legal secretary for Judge Keith Hayes. 
New personnel rules were adopted in April 1978 stating that the 
judges' secretary served at the pleasure of the judges and were 
not entitled to "the normal termination procedures of notice 
and hearing accorded regular County employees." Ms. Gabe had 
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no notice or the rule and upon her discharge was given neither 
written notice nor a hearing. 
The facts of Gabe are completely inappropriate to 
the present case. The Appellant was never treated as an "at 
will" employee by the judges; their ex parte order restricted 
Appellant's access to court records,.but did not terminate her. 
In fact, the language of the order states "upon her return to 
employment" she be reassigned. Such is not the language one 
uses to terminate someone as claimed by Appellant. 
The results of the ex parte order are the doing of 
Ogden City and not the Board of Judges. If there was a denial 
of due process or a violation of Civil Service Rules, it was 
not through the actions of the Judgesf.but through the actions 
of Mr. Mallory. This has not been appealed. In factf Exhibit 
6-P, the Oruer of the Ogden City Civil Service Commission 
expressly states that the Ogden City Manager's actions were in 
compliance with its Rules wherein it says: "IT IS ORDERED that 
the Order of the Ogden City Manager dated April 7v 1983, is 
sustained except . . . " The District Court also sustained that 
Order of the Commission and Mr. Mallory. This was handled as a 
separate item by the Commission who separately sustained the 
right of the Judges to not allow her to go back to the clerk's 
otfice. 
It appears that what Appellant is trying to do is 
appeal the Decision of the City Manager dated April 7v 1983, 
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under the guise of there being a violation by the Judges. The 
two are separate and distinct. This attempt to "bandaid" 
causes ot action to somehow "stick" them together is 
inappropriate. In light of such serious findings of fact by 
the City Managerf a mere demotion would not protect the 
records. The Appellant would still have access to the records 
and, therefore, a continuing opportunity to breach her 
fiduciary duty. The Judge's order was designed to deny such 
access to the Appellant,.but not designed to terminate the 
Appellant's job. Therefore, Gabe as supporting authority, 
misses the mark. 
There was no denial of due process on the part of the 
Judges in issuing their order and there was no denial of 
Appellant's civil service rights by the Judges or their order. 
POINT THREE 
APPELLANT DID NOT BECOME A STATE EMPLOYEE AS OF 
JULY 1, 1983w THE ORDER OF THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL 
SERVICE COMMISSION TO THAT EFFECT WAS CORRECT. 
Ogden City, as a third party plaintiff, alleges that 
the Appellant should be considered a state employee as of July 
1, 1983, because of Utah Code Ann. 78-4-21(2). However, such a 
result would be an injustice and would be inconsistent with the 
true interpretation and meaning of 78-4-21(2). 
Statute 78-4-21(2) reads in pertinent part as 
follows: 
As ot July 1, 1983, circuit court support staff 
and clerical personnel in primary circuit court 
locations as certified by the state court 
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administrator shall be employees of the State of 
Utah. Persons employed as circuit court support 
staff and clerical personnel as of January 1, 
1983, shall automatically be designated 
employees of the State of Utah. 
It has long been the policy of the courts to refrain 
from the use of statutory construction when the language used 
in a disputed statute is clear and unambiguous. This principle 
was empnasized in the case of State v. Archuletta, 526.P.2d 
911.(Utah 1974) where the court stated: 
The intention of the legislature is to be 
collected from the words they employ. Where 
there is no ambiguity in the words,,there is no 
room for construction. [citing United States 
v. Wiltberger, 5;Wheat. 76, 95* 5 L.Ed. 37-
(1920) (at 912)] 
The wording ot Utah Code Annotated § 78-4-21(2) 
appears clear and unambiguous at first glance. Applying this 
statute as it reads on its face (as urged by the City), the 
Appellant should be deemed a state employee as of July lf 1983, 
because she was employed among the clerical personnel in a 
primary circuit court location as of January 1, 1983. Thus,. 
the city contends she should automatically become a state 
employee as of July 1, 1983. 
However, applying this same reading of this 
supposedly clear and unambiguous statute, any person who was 
employed as clerical personnel as of January 1, 1983f who 
subsequently retired in the interim between January 1, and July 
1/ would also be deemed a state employee as of July 1, 1983. 
The same situation would apply to anyone so employed who was 
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subsequently terminated from his or her position or transferred 
to a different agency in city government. And if these 
examples are not adequate illustration of the potential 
absurdities resulting from application of the "clear11 meaning 
of the statute, it is also truef according to the words of the 
statute on its face, that any person so employed as of January 
1, 1983r who subsequently died between January 1 and July 1, 
would nevertheless be automatically deemed a state employee as 
of July 1, 1983 even though that person may now be dead. 
It is ridiculous to believe the legislature intended 
that retired, transferredf fired or expired people 
automatically become state employees. A statute subject to 
interpretation is presumed not to have been intended to produce 
absurd consequences,.but to have the most reasonable operation 
that its language permits. Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 217 
111. 312f 111 N.E. 128. If possible, doubtful provisions 
should be given a reasonable, rational, and sensible 
construction. Alexander v. Cosden Pipe Line Co.. 290 U.S. 
484: In the case ot Hernandez v. Frothmiller, 204 P.2d<854 
68 Ariz. 242 (1949), the Arizona Supreme Court said: 
We recognize the rule that, when giving the 
literal meaning to language of a statute results 
in an absurdity or impossibility, courts will 
under some circumstances alter, modify, or 
supply words in order to give effect to the 
plain intention of the lawmaker. 
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Since absurd results will occur through applications 
ot the Utah statute as it reads on its facef it is appropriate 
for the court in this case to search for the true intent of the 
legislature. In seeking the true meaning of the statutef one 
must "assume that every statute contains a logical and complete 
legislative scheme . . . It is this legislative scheme that 
should be regarded as the purpose,.object, intentr spiritf of 
the act." 4 Sutherland Statutory Construction 26. The 
logical meaning or the statute is that the legislature intended 
that those who were employed as support staff or clerical 
personnel in primary circuit locations as of January 1, 1983f 
should automatically become state employees as of July lf 1983 
— provided howeverf.that they continued in their employment 
through June 30f 1983w 
This likely meaning is supported by language found 
within the same statute. U.C.A. 78-4-21(2) goes on to say that 
"compensation for circuit court personnel employed as municipal 
employees prior to July lf 1983f and who become state employees 
after July 1# 1983, shall not be less than the compensation 
received as municipal employees prior to January lf 1983. 
Circuit court personnel employed as municipal employees prior 
to July lf 1983f shall become state employees without loss of 
tenure or other benefits ... . ." This passage evidences the 
intent ot the legislature that the provisions of the statute 
apply to those who are employed prior to July 1, or in other 
words, up to and through June 30, 1983* 
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As was argued before in this Brieff the status of 
whether Mr. Mallory was correct in his decision to place 
Appellant on inactive status has really not been appealed. The 
Ogden City Civil Service Commission in essence ruled that 
Appellant maintain "city" employee status, but not "court 
clerk" status. There are many Ogden City employees who did not 
become state employees on July 1, 1983. Appellant is no 
different from these. Though she was employed in the Clerks 
office on January 1* 1983, she was not working there on June 
30, 1983 and, and had not been working there since March, 1983. 
The Civil Service Commission acknowledged in its 
Order that she maintain city status. This is wholly consistent 
with the statutory language cited above, as well as the 
actualities or what happened. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has appealed issues that have no ripeness 
to be before this Court. The action taken by the Judges did 
not violate Appellant's rights but merely mandated a change in 
assignment. The proper party has not been named or "appealed" 
for what Appellant seeks in relief. 
Judges of the Third Circuit,.as do other judges,.have 
not only the right, but the duty to oversee the court records. 
The action of the Board ot Judges was pursuant to both that 
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right and duty. There was no violation of the Appellant's 
rights. The judges restricted the Appellant's access to court 
records they did not terminate her. 
All the process due the Appellant she received. It 
would be inequitable to allow the Appellant to rely on civil 
service rules to retain a position of trust which she 
blantantly and repeatedly violated. 
The decision of the District Court as it relates to 
the Order of the District Court should be affirmed in its 
entirety. 
Appellant did not become a state employee on July 1, 
1983. The City's limited argument is not convincing or 
correct. 
DATED this &fcr day.of Marchf 1984: 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
.'EPHEN GT SCHWENDIMAN --
Assistant Attorney General 
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